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Abstract
Terrorism often leads to increased stigmatization of groups perceived as “out-
groups”. We test two versions of out-group theory and ask whether citizens clearly 
distinguish between radical Muslims and Muslims in general, or if the fear of ter-
rorism is associated with a general distrust of Muslims? We conducted a survey 
experiment  among Norwegian citizens designed to determine the effect of group 
treatments on the participants’ attitudes towards wiretapping. We find that our 
group treatments strongly influence the participants’ attitudes towards wiretapping. 
However, the hypothesis that the fear of terrorism leads to a backlash against Mus-
lims in general is rejected. Still, Norwegians are prepared to give the police leeway 
towards the two groups identified by the police as the greatest security risks, i.e., 
radical Muslim and extreme right-wing groups. Our evidence suggests that citizens 
are capable of discriminating between groups who aim explicitly at undermining 
democracy and groups perceived as different from themselves.
Keywords Counterterrorist policies · Civil rights · In-group versus out-group · 
Survey experiment
Introduction
Fear and intimidation are crucial components characterizing acts of terror (Wilkin-
son 1992). Terrorism is not only about the physical or material consequences of 
an attack but also the psychological impact an attack has on a society, which likely 
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lingers for many years after the attack. Thus, fighting fear can be a crucial com-
ponent of counterterrorist policies (Christensen and Aars 2017a, b). However, 
these policies can be affected by citizens’ psychological reactions to acts of terror. 
According to previous US studies, citizens react very differently to terror incidents, 
and diverging psychological reactions have different political consequences (Huddy 
et al. 2005; Huddy and Feldman 2011). Anger and the fear of terrorism have been 
associated with support for repressive measures, increased intolerance and preju-
dices against groups and minorities in society. For example, in January 2017, the 
newly elected US president, Donald Trump, signed an order restricting entry into 
the country for citizens from seven predominantly Muslim countries. The travel 
ban targeted a distinct group of people, i.e., Muslims, and limited their freedom of 
movement regardless of whether they posed a threat. Hence, in the face of a terror-
ist threat, do people project their fear onto collective groups, such as Muslims in 
general?
The article makes several contributions to research on the relationship between 
terrorism and attitudes towards out-groups. First, our research redirects attention 
away from general attitudes towards out-groups to the civil rights of these groups. 
To our knowledge, our article is the first to study how the threat of terrorism influ-
ences citizens’ attitudes towards counterterrorist policies that target specific groups. 
Second, by distinguishing theoretically and empirically between different types 
of out-groups, we develop a more nuanced framework for analysing the interplay 
between out-group characteristics and civil rights. Finally, our study breaks new 
empirical ground by looking beyond the United States—the most thoroughly stud-
ied case when it comes to terrorism and out-group attitudes. We believe that our 
results suggest further tests on the European side of the Atlantic would be useful. 
Norway represents a tough case because it is a high-trust country. In addition, Nor-
way has recently experienced right-wing terrorism. The terrorist attack was met by a 
resounding rejection and a rally around common values.
Since the 9/11 attacks in the United States, anti-terror policies have been on 
political agendas in all countries in the Western World. Although the Norwegian 
experience with terrorism was fundamentally altered after the 7/22 terrorist attacks 
at Oslo and Utøya, the country has been spared from such terrifying incidents (Fim-
reite et al. 2013; Nordenhaug and Engene 2008). The 9/11 attacks in the US were 
conducted by a group of radical Muslims who acted on behalf of a wider terrorist 
network. In Norway, the 7/22 attacks were conducted by the right-wing extremist 
Anders Breivik acting on behalf of no one but himself. Terrorist attacks create an 
immediate state of emergency and, in the long term, represent important crossroads 
in the transnational fight against terror (Bloch-Elkon 2011; Epifanio 2011). Since 
9/11, the fear of terrorist attacks has moved political leaders in many countries to 
curtail civil rights (Epifanio 2011; Mueller and Stewart 2012; Engene 2013, 2016; 
Lehrke and Schomaker 2014; Pokalova 2015). However, countries strongly differ 
in their response to terrorism. According to Epifanio (2011, p. 399), certain coun-
tries (for instance, the U.S. and UK) have “implemented the full battery of regula-
tory responses while others (i.e., Scandinavian countries and Switzerland) remain 
reluctant to cut deeply into the net of civil rights for citizens, suspects and immi-
grants alike”. In 2015, over one million refugees entered Europe from embattled 
1 3
Political Behavior 
countries, and the increased number of refugees has further shifted the focus in 
the fight against terrorism (Roth 2016). The combination of the fear of terror and 
the increased number of refugees has contributed to increased support for extreme 
right-wing parties, candidates and groups (Inglehart and Norris 2016). Thus, terror-
ist threats place democratic regimes under severe pressure. Although actual attacks 
rarely occur in most countries, the threat posed by terrorism can create fear among 
citizens. Western Europe experienced a sharp increase in terrorist incidents in 2015, 
and 2016 when several attacks were conducted by the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL). Even if the fears are exaggerated, fearful responses to terrorist threats 
may induce governments to act decisively. In turn, decisive action to counter terror-
ism and protect citizens often implies a weakening of certain basic democratic rights 
of citizens, specific minorities, and values that underpin democratic government. 
Hence, in their efforts to protect the democratic government, the decision-makers 
run the risk of undermining the basics of democracy.
This article presents the results of a survey experiment developed and executed 
to determine whether Norwegian citizens’ attitudes towards wiretapping are condi-
tional on the group(s) targeted. Specifically, we examined whether attitudes towards 
wiretapping conducted by the Police Security Service (PST) are dependent on the 
social groups wiretapped by the PST. In this study, a realistic terrorist scenario is 
established, and the name of the social group to be wiretapped is randomized. We 
focus on the use of wiretapping as a well-known counterterrorism method in the 
fight against terrorism. The use of such methods is justified because these meth-
ods can contribute to the prevention and detection of various criminal actions with 
potential dramatic consequences for society. The argument against these methods is 
that they may violate basic democratic rights, such as the rule of law and privacy.
Our study has two specific aims. First, based on group-categorization theory, we 
aim to determine whether citizens are guided by their principles regarding wiretap-
ping or whether they allow the PST greater leeway to wiretap certain social groups. 
Which groups represent the largest threat according to the citizens? Do citizens dif-
ferentiate between radical Muslims (out-group) and Muslims in general (in-group) 
or is there a general stigmatization of Muslims in the population overall? Second, 
citizens could react differently to the group treatments because of their different ide-
ological predispositions. In the analysis, we test whether the treatments interact with 
support for the right-wing anti-immigrant Progress Party (PP).
This study reveals that exposing citizens to different social groups strongly influ-
ences their attitudes towards wiretapping. Norwegians are willing to provide lee-
way to the PST in investigating the two groups identified by the PST as the great-
est potential security risk, i.e., radical Muslim and extreme right-wing groups. Both 
groups are out-groups that have shown the willingness to cross the boundary of what 
is acceptable in a democracy. However, our respondents clearly distinguish radi-
cal Muslims from Muslims in general. Citizens are not more willing to support the 
wiretapping of a Muslim congregation than the respondents in the control condition 
(a social group). These findings highlight the importance of distinguishing between 
the two versions of out-group theory, the first focusing on groups that demonstra-
bly pose a terrorist threat and the second focusing on peoples’ general perceptions 
of groups in society. Furthermore, overall support for wiretapping is higher among 
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Progress Party supporters than among supporters of other parties. PP supporters 
exposed to the Muslim congregation treatment are not significantly more likely to 
support wiretapping than PP supporters in the control group.
First, we briefly review the context of our study. Based on this overview and 
group-categorization theory, we outline the expectations of our findings. Then, we 
describe the data and our experimental design. Finally, we present the results and 
discuss the policy implications of our findings.
The Context of the Study
Although Norway has been reluctant to deeply reduce the civil rights of certain citi-
zens, such as suspects and immigrants, the police have been given greater discretion 
over time (Husabø 2013; Engene 2016). In 2005, the police were granted the oppor-
tunity to use wiretapping in conjunction with extended forms of crime, and the ban 
on covert audio surveillance was lifted. Previously, the PST (the police) needed rea-
sonable ground to engage in hidden surveillance, but currently, no special permis-
sion is needed to use these methods (Husabø 2013). In May 2016, the Norwegian 
parliament passed a bill allowing the PST to tap phones and conduct surveillance of 
other types of communication, such as e-mails and computer traffic (so-called “com-
puter reading”) if a possible terrorist plot is suspected (Innst. 343 L (2015–2016)). 
These methods may weaken the individual rights and privacy of individuals and 
groups in society.
The policy responses of established democracies to the threat of terrorism are 
controversial. Certain scholars consider these policies necessary, while other schol-
ars believe that these measures are too extreme (Chenoweth 2013; Engene 2016). 
The debate involves not only the need for stricter counterterrorist measures (Sunstein 
2004; Mueller and Stewart 2012) but also the policy tools that are implemented. 
There is no consensus regarding which policies are most effective in fighting terror 
(Mueller and Stewart 2012; Dragu and Polborn 2014; Neumayer et al. 2014; Engene 
2016). Thus far, the objectives have been to expose potential terrorists and eliminate 
their organizations. According to the critics, there has been less focus on prevention 
and the fight against violent extremism as the means to prevent the recruitment of 
individuals to terrorist organizations. Whether the politicians’ focus on the “supply-
side” has led to more security is uncertain (Sunstein 2004). According to Dragu and 
Polborn (2014, p. 513), “researchers have yet to determine whether enlarging execu-
tive discretion at the expense of fundamental rights liberties increases security from 
terrorism, even though all prominent (liberty-reducing) counterterrorism policies 
assume it does”. According to these researchers, a repressive anti-terror policy could 
have substantial costs by undermining the legitimacy of the political system among 
groups in which potential terror groups have their roots. These policies could lead to 
group stigmatization and thus more, rather than less, terrorism.
How societies can best protect themselves from terrorism has become an 
important political dividing line in Western democracies (Pantazis and Pemberton 
2009; Engene 2016). The key question in this debate is how societies find a bal-
ance between civil rights and the need for safety. How this discussion is framed 
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has changed (Davis and Silver 2004). Before 2001, the debate had a stronger 
focus on citizens’ need for protection against the authorities (the state). After 
9/11, the focus has shifted to how limits need to be pushed in the fight against a 
common external enemy (the terrorists). The latter frame expands the number of 
possible political solutions. For instance, the former president of France, Nico-
las Sarkozy, has proposed integration camps or electronic tagging of terror-sus-
pected Islamists regardless of whether they have actually committed a crime (The 
Economist September 3 2016). These types of proposals occur in light of the new 
security context after 9/11. Opinion studies have shown that citizens’ attitudes 
are contingent on how political questions are framed (Berinsky 2016; Druckman 
and Lupia 2016). Threatening events and a common external enemy can lead the 
population to support policies that weaken the legal safeguards of certain social 
groups in the population. Terrorism creates the impression that the authorities 
do not have the necessary control (Altheide 2006; Lerner et al. 2003), and citi-
zens might be willing to support far-reaching policies to avoid fear, particularly in 
regard to groups that differ from themselves (Sunstein 2004).
Our main research question concerns whether the degree of support for stricter 
counterterrorism measures is conditioned on the groups such measures are tar-
geting. Therefore, in the following discussion the centre of attention is group-
categorization theory.
Group‑Categorization Theory and Expectations
Do citizens consider civil and political rights absolute or do opinions on wiretap-
ping depend on the group targeted by the counterterrorist police authorities? Will 
citizens clearly differentiate between a random group in society and Muslims in 
general? Do attitudes towards members of perceived deviant groups vary accord-
ing to the respondents’ ideological predispositions? These questions serve as a 
foundation for the subsequent discussion and analysis.
The overall question is whether civil rights are perceived as absolute or 
whether the population conducts a more pragmatic assessment regarding the 
question of surveillance (Beetham 1999). Rights are considered absolute if 
they cannot be ignored under any circumstances regardless of the consequences 
(Gewirth 1981, p. 2). Thus, rights are unconditional. If citizens consider rights 
absolute, their attitudes should not be affected by the groups under surveillance. 
This position represents the following null hypothesis in our analysis:
H0 Citizens’ attitudes towards wiretapping are unaffected by the group wiretapped 
by the police authorities.
However, numerous studies argue that citizens associate the principles of pri-
vacy and the rule of the law with various social groups (Chong 1993). People 
simplify the subject by sorting individuals into  groups when making concrete 
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assessments (Petersen et al. 2011). Two versions of the so-called “group-categori-
zation” theory guide our experiment.
The first version focuses on the characteristics of the groups. According to this 
version, citizens are more willing to restrict the freedom of speech of groups who 
actively proclaim their preparedness to violate the democratic fabric of society 
(Sniderman et  al. 2014). Citizens are expected to relate political rights to sub-
groups expressing views that conflict with those of the broader society or groups 
that operate on the edge of the law or the perceived common moral norms of soci-
ety. Thus, citizens’ attitudes towards counterterrorist measures can be based on 
information about groups that might represent a threat to their safety. Anti-terror-
ist measures focus on the same types of out-groups in society. In their risk analy-
sis, the PST has identified radical Muslim groups and right-wing extremists as the 
most important risk groups (PST 2016), which is unsurprising considering the 
international terror events and Norwegian experience with terrorism in 2011. The 
PST assesses radical Islam as the greatest threat, but the threat from right-wing 
extremists is considered to be increasing (PST 2016, p. 2). The PST considers the 
increasing threat from the extreme right in light of “mobilization around issues 
related to refugees and asylum seekers”. The two forms of extremism in the PST 
risk reports, i.e., radical Islamism and extreme right extremism, are examples of 
out-groups. Both out-groups have demonstrated that they are willing to cross the 
boundary of what is deemed democratically acceptable, and therefore, we expect 
citizens to give the PST permission to follow these two groups closely. Thus, we 
approach our empirical analysis with the following hypothesis:
H1 Citizens are more likely to support wiretapping if the wiretap targets a radical 
Muslim group or a right-wing extremist group.
The second version of the group-categorization theory is based on the popu-
lation’s perceptions of different groups rather than on the group characteristics. 
Studies that have been conducted in the American context indicate that the fear 
of terrorism strengthens group identity towards in-groups, while at the same time 
the population becomes increasingly hostile towards groups perceived as “differ-
ent” (Sunstein 2004; Huddy et al. 2002, 2005; Das et al. 2009; Huddy and Feld-
man 2011). The combination of frightening terrorism events and immigration can 
lead citizens to become increasingly fearful, angry and concerned about security 
in a society characterized by greater ethnic diversity. For instance, the concept 
of “securitization” implies that the issue of security has such a strong salience 
that it is incorporated into most other policy areas and thereby legitimizes heavy-
handed measures to regain security (Buzan and Wæver 2003, p. 491). In such a 
heated atmosphere, the issue of immigration could transmute into a question of 
security, and all immigrant groups risk could be portrayed as security threats. 
Hence, do people clearly differentiate between radical Muslims and Muslims in 
general or do they view all Muslims as belonging to the same category? Previ-
ous studies have shown that negative perceptions of Muslims are widespread in 
Europe (Strabac and Listhaug 2008; Savelkoul et al. 2012; Ogan et al. 2014). Do 
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these anti-Muslim attitudes increase citizens’ willingness to accept greater inter-
vention against Muslims in general? According to a study investigating Norwe-
gians’ attitudes towards Muslims using open questions, many Norwegians con-
sider Muslims a threat to important societal values, and formulations related to 
terrorism are not uncommon (Moe et al. 2016, p. 9). Does a perceived security 
threat increase the willingness to permit greater leeway for the PST to wiretap 
Muslims in general? Muslim communities are likely considered recruitment ven-
ues for future terrorists, and a general stereotypical perception of Muslims as a 
group exists. Therefore, in our experiment, we tested whether citizens distinguish 
between radical Muslims and Muslims in general when confronted with a real-
istic terror plot. Norway should be a strong test of backlash against Muslims in 
general. Norway is one of the highest-ranking trust countries (Wollebæk et  al. 
2012), something that could provide democratic resilience towards stigmatiza-
tion of out-groups. Another difference is Norway’s experience with right-wing 
extremist terrorism that brought citizens together rather than drove them apart. A 
natural experiment studying attitudes towards immigrants around the 2011 terror 
attacks finds that Norwegians became more positive towards immigrants after the 
attacks (Jakobsson and Blom 2014). The analysis tests the following hypothesis:
H2 Citizens are more likely to support the wiretapping of a Muslim congregation 
than the wiretapping of a random social group.
In addition, we assume that the respondents will react differently to identi-
cal stimuli because people have different predispositions. In addition to the two 
versions of the group-categorization theory, we predict distinct differences in 
citizens’ attitudes towards wiretapping depending on their political preferences. 
Because people cannot monitor every issue, they rely on party preferences as 
shortcuts in forming their opinions (Tilly and Hobolt 2011). Numerous studies 
have shown that partisanship acts as a filter to enable citizens to understand poli-
cies, particularly following dramatic events (Gadarian 2010; Klar 2013; Albertson 
and Gadarian 2015). According to studies performed in the U.S., ideological cues 
have implications for political attitudes, particularly towards out-groups (Zavala 
et  al. 2010; Hatemi et  al. 2013). For instance, right-wing party identification is 
associated with stronger anti-immigrant attitudes and prejudicial attitudes towards 
members of stigmatized groups. We examined these heterogeneous effects using 
support for the Progress Party (PP). The PP is frequently characterized as a some-
what marginal case of a radical right-wing party. For instance, Mudde (2016, p. 
2) labels the PP a “neo-liberal populist” party. However, an essential issue for the 
PP is to limit immigration, particularly from non-Western and Muslim countries, 
and anti-immigrant attitudes are widespread among PP supporters (Berntzen and 
Sandberg 2014). The PP also warns against the Islamization of Norwegian soci-
ety, and the PP’s chairwoman, Siv Jensen, introduced the term “stealth Islamiza-
tion” (snik-islamisering) in her speech to the party’s congress in 2009 (Bangstad 
2013). Therefore, by performing an empirical analysis, we examine whether PP 
supporters are more inclined to support the wiretapping of Muslims in general.
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H3 PP supporters are more inclined to support the wiretapping of a Muslim congre-
gation than the wiretapping of a random social group.
To reveal possible hidden preferences and provide robust evidence regarding the 
importance of group cues in citizens’ attitudes towards wiretapping, we conducted a 
survey experiment. In the following section, we describe the data and experimental 
design.
Data and Experimental Design
The data are derived from the Norwegian Citizen Panel, which is an Internet-based 
survey about Norwegians’ attitudes towards different topics in society. The panel 
is operated by social scientists at the University of Bergen and NORCE (Norwe-
gian Research Centre) and is used for research purposes only. The panel is not self-
recruiting, and thus, the participants represent a cross section of the Norwegian pop-
ulation. The panel participants are invited to provide their opinion twice a year.
We collected our data between October 28 and the middle of November of 2015.1 
The data were obtained from a random sample of 1500 respondents from a total of 
10,247 panel members (Skjervheim and Høgestøl 2015). To reveal whether people 
relate political rights and tolerance to specific social groups, we designed our study 
as a survey experiment (Mutz 2011). The alternative would have been to ask the 
respondents direct questions regarding the social groups that they would allow the 
PST to wiretap. The experimental design of the survey has several advantages for 
understanding how citizens form their opinions. First, people’s attitudes towards the 
wiretapping of specific social groups represent a sensitive topic, and respondents 
may not disclose their actual attitudes when asked direct questions about this topic 
(Rosenfeld et al. 2016). Thus, using direct questions might result in the underreport-
ing of the respondents’ willingness to permit the PST to wiretap certain groups. For 
example, we could not be able to reveal peoples’ attitudes towards Muslims in gen-
eral. Second, the random allocation of treatments ensures that the potential attitudes 
of the individuals in the treatment groups are identical to the potential attitudes of 
those in the control group. Hence, this method is highly useful for shedding light on 
the causes of attitudes (Cappelen et al. 2016).
We designed a straightforward experiment. The survey respondents were pre-
sented with a potential realistic terror plot. We only manipulated one variable, i.e., 
the social group to be wiretapped by the PST, and all other conditions remained con-
stant. Hence, in this experiment, we could test whether exposure to distinct social 
groups shapes the respondents’ attitudes towards wiretapping. In total, 1500 ran-
domly selected respondents were asked the following question:
1 The data were collected only days before the terror attack in Paris on November 13, 2015. Approxi-




Imagine that the Police Security Service (PST) has requested permission to 
wiretap the phones of members or sympathizers of [group X] because they 
believe it might help them investigate a terror plot. Some people agree that 
the PST should be allowed because it may avert terror plots early, while others 
believe that the PST should not be allowed because it would be an excessive 
interference with the privacy of the group. Do you agree or disagree that the 
PST should be allowed to perform such wiretapping?
The question referred directly to the investigation of a terror plot, with an accom-
panying request by the PST to use wiretapping to avert the terror plot. Our intention 
was to create an experiment that was as realistic as possible, and wiretapping was 
selected as a covert police method because most people are likely familiar with this 
method. Then, we randomly assigned the individuals to one of five groups: a control 
group and the following four different treatment groups:
(1) “A radical Muslim group”
(2) “A Muslim congregation”
(3) “A right-wing extreme group”
(4) “The Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet)”
(5) “A social group” (Control group)
The first four groups constituted the treatment groups, while the respondents 
exposed to a “social group” constituted the control group. In designing survey 
experiments, reflecting upon the requirements of a good control group is necessary. 
Using a neutral category as the control group is a well-known and recommended 
solution (Alebertson and Gadarian 2016, p. 485). The term “a social group” meets 
this requirement and is neutral both in religious and political terms. We assume that 
the respondents associate a social group with any grouping in society. The question 
had seven response categories ranging from “strongly agree” (1) to “strongly disa-
gree” (7). The experiment randomly exposed the respondents to two extreme social 
groups on two dimensions. The first dimension was the “Muslim” dimension, i.e., 
“a Radical Muslim group” (out-group) versus “a Muslim congregation” (in-group). 
The second dimension was the “right-wing” dimension, i.e., “a right-wing extremist 
group” (out-group) versus the “Progress Party (PP)” (in-group). Although we had 
no reason to believe that citizens would support the wiretapping of the members and 
sympathizers of the PP, this party was selected as a contrast to the extreme right-
wing groups.2
Because 1500 respondents participated in this study, a maximum of 300 respond-
ents could be randomly assigned to each of the five groups. The final analysis 
included 1399 respondents. The number of missing values is equally distributed 
2 The Progress Party was the only group specified in the experiment. We considered naming (specifying) 
groups on the other dimensions as well, but we feared that doing so would result in a larger proportion of 
missing answers since we expected these groups to be less known among the public. In addition, the PST 
use the more general concepts (right-wing extremists, and radical Muslims) in their risk assessments.
 Political Behavior
1 3
across the five groups, and therefore, we assume that the number of missing values 
is random. The results of the multinomial regressions using the control group as 
the base outcome verify that the treatment groups were balanced in terms of gen-
der, age, education and partisanship (see Table 3 in the appendix). None of these 
background characteristics approached the conventional levels of statistical signifi-
cance (p < 0.05, two tailed). Compared with the control group, the university edu-
cated respondents and female subjects had a slightly higher probability of being 
assigned to the right-wing extremist group (p < 0.10, two tailed). To enhance clarity, 
we changed and standardized the scale in the final empirical analysis such that 100 
represents “strongly agree” and 0 represents “strongly disagree”.
Results
The empirical analysis was performed in three steps. First, we performed a simple 
bivariate regression analysis to compare the four treatment groups to the control 
group. Second, we tested the groups against each other in pairs. Third, we tested 
whether the treatments interact with support for the Progress Party.
Did the respondents identify the two extreme groups in the experiment? Does the 
fear of radical Muslim groups influence peoples’ attitudes towards Muslims in gen-
eral? We performed a simple comparison of the average attitudes towards wiretap-
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Fig. 1  Attitudes towards wiretapping: Group-categorization experiment (Averages with 95% CI’s—
N = 1399, scale 0 (strongly disagree) to 100 (strongly agree)
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These numbers are provided in Fig. 1. First, we consider the overall level of sup-
port for wiretapping. The results indicate that Norwegians are highly willing to per-
mit the PST to wiretap people’s phones to prevent terrorist attacks. Hence, people’s 
trust in the PST appears to be high. Across all groups, the average is 72.3 on the 
scale ranging from 0 to 100 (0 = strongly disagree and 100 = strongly agree). Nota-
ble, the question clearly states that the PST actually considers wiretapping as helpful 
in an investigation of a potential terrorist plot. In addition, previous studies have 
shown that compared to other measures, such as holding people in detention with-
out a trial, wiretapping as a counterterrorist measure is widely supported within the 
population (Fimreite et  al. 2013). In this study, the respondents’ trust in the PST 
was relatively high. However, this finding also indicates that people do not consider 
privacy an absolute right. If wiretapping was considered a serious infringement of 
privacy rights, the respondents would likely be less willing to permit the PST to 
interfere with other people’s personal lives.
Second, our study provides strong evidence against the null hypothesis that citi-
zens’ attitudes are unaffected by the group to be wiretapped by the PST. Privacy 
rights are not considered absolute and are highly dependent on the targeted group. 
The average level of support for wiretapping under the control condition (a social 
group) is 70.34, and unsurprisingly, people are least willing to use wiretapping 
against members of the PP (average = 56.15). The PP is an established party in the 
Norwegian system and is one of the two current member parties in the Norwegian 
coalition government. The underlying reason of these differences is unclear, but this 
result could indicate that the surveillance of political parties is a sensitive topic. 
Also, the PP is the only group that is specified directly in the experiment. Further-
more, as we expected, the request by the PST to wiretap the two extremist groups 
was supported by the respondents. The average level of support for the wiretapping 
of right-wing extremists is 79.45 while the corresponding number for the wiretap-
ping of a radical Muslim group is 82.41. Both figures are significantly higher than 
that in the control group, thus providing support for our first hypothesis. Further-
more, the Norwegians clearly distinguished between radical Muslims and Muslims 
in general (“a Muslim congregation”). The average of the respondents exposed to 
“a Muslim congregation” is 73.19, while the corresponding number in the con-
trol group is 70.34. As indicated by the overlapping confidence intervals between 
these two groups, the difference is not significant. Hence, the analysis rejects our 
second hypothesis, which posits that faced with a terrorist threat citizens stigmatize 
Muslims in general. The citizens’ support for wiretapping Muslims appear to be as 
strong as for wiretapping any other group in society. However, we cannot exclude 
the possibility that respondents in the control group might have thought about Mus-
lims as a potential social group to wiretap. Furthermore, we conducted the experi-
ment prior to many of the recent major terrorist attacks in Europe, such as the Paris 
attacks in November 2015 (130 people killed), the bombs in Brussels in March 2016 
(32 people killed), and the attack in Nice in July 2016 (84 people killed) (Nesser 
2014; Nesser et al. 2016; Europol 2016).
These initial results have three important implications. First, our treatments had 
considerable effects on the citizens’ attitudes towards wiretapping. Second, the expo-
sure to the two extremist group cues significantly increased support for wiretapping. 
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Third, no difference was observed between the Muslim congregation treatment and 
the control condition. Norwegians do not consider civil rights absolute and make 
pragmatic assessments according to the group the PST intends to monitor.
Figure 1 illustrates the average level of support for wiretapping in the four treat-
ment groups against the control condition (“a social group”). Next, we present the 
results of the analysis in which each pair of groups was tested against each other. 
The results are shown in Table  1. Two findings are particularly interesting. First, 
as shown in Fig. 1, the respondents clearly distinguished between Muslims in gen-
eral and radical Muslims. Norwegians are far less likely to accept a request from 
the PST to wiretap members of a Muslim congregation than to accept the wiretap-
ping of a radical Muslim group. The difference is − 9.23% points and is significant. 
This result is consistent with an experimental study performed in Denmark after the 
so-called cartoon controversy in 2005 and 2006 (Sniderman et  al. 2014). Further-
more, this result is consistent with findings from Norwegian studies investigating 
the restriction of the freedom of expression in various social groups, including Mus-
lims (Midtbøen and Steen-Johnsen 2016; Steen-Johnsen et  al. 2016). Second, the 
respondents are not less likely to accept a request from the police to wiretap a radi-
cal Muslim group compared to a request to wiretap a right-wing extremist group. 
The difference between the two groups is small (− 2.95) and does not achieve the 
conventional 5% level of statistical significance (p < 0.10, two tailed). Thus, the 
respondents appear to consider the two groups as equally important threats. This 
result likely reflects the experience of the attack of 7/22 2011. The perpetrator, 
Anders Behring Breivik, had the following clear political motivation for the killings 
at Oslo and Utøya: opposition to immigration in general and the Islamic civiliza-
tion in particular. The extreme right has not only been a threat in Norway but also a 
threat that Norwegian citizens have painfully experienced.
Table 1 shows that the citizens are far less willing to accept the wiretapping of 
members of the PP than the wiretapping of members of a Muslim congregation. 
The difference is − 17% points and clearly significant. As previously mentioned, this 
finding likely indicates that Norwegians are more sensitive to the surveillance of 
Table 1  Wiretapping: test of pairwise group differences (scale 0–100, N = 1399)
**5%-level, ***1%-level
Groups Difference (standard errors)
Muslim congregation vs. Radical Muslims − 9.23 (2.030)***
Right-wing extremists vs. Radical Muslims − 2.95 (1.804)
Progress Party vs. Radical Muslims − 26.26 (2.229)***
Social group (control) vs. Radical Muslims − 12.07 (2.163)***
Right-wing extremists vs. Muslim congregation 6.28 (2.058)**
Progress Party vs. Muslim congregation − 17.04 (2.439)***
Social group (control) vs. Muslim congregation − 2.85 (2.379)
Progress Party vs. right-wing extremists − 23.31 (2.255)***
Social group (control) vs. right-wing extremists − 9.12 (2.189)***
Social group (control) vs. progress party 14.19 (2.551)***
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political parties in general and the PP in particular. Furthermore, as illustrated in the 
table, the respondents clearly distinguished between the PP and more extreme right-
wing groups.
Finally, we tested whether the treatment effect differed based on political predis-
positions. Because regressing attitudes towards wiretapping included an interaction 
term that could lead to conflicting estimates of the main effects, we performed a 
one-way ANOVA model and graphed the marginal effects (see Mitchell 2012, p. 
241). The model includes the treatment groups, Progress Party support and the 
interactions between the two as explanatory variables. Thus, the treatment interacts 
with a dummy variable separating the PP supporters from the remaining respond-
ents. Table 2 presents the results of the ANOVA model. The F-statistics reveal that 
the interaction between treatment and support for the PP is significant at the 5% 
level. Therefore, the null hypothesis positing that the average level of support for 
wiretapping is equal regardless of the treatment to which the PP supporters were 
exposed can be rejected.
Because the ANOVA only tests whether the interaction is significant, we com-
puted the adjusted average attitudes towards wiretapping by treatment and PP sup-
port using the margins (and contrast) commands in Stata. These numbers are pro-
vided in Fig. 2. The figure displays that the overall support for wiretapping is higher 
among the PP party supporters than that among those voting for other parties (and 
non-voters). The differences are sizeable for PP supporters exposed to the different 
treatments. The average level of support for wiretapping among the PP supporters 
in the control group (exposed to a social group) is as high as 84.1, while the cor-
responding number for the other party supporters is 69.1 (difference = 15% points). 
Security therefore has a distinct political dimension. Terrorist attacks place ques-
tions of law and order on the political agenda, which are issues strongly associated 
with right wing conservative ideology (Klar 2013). Thus, concerns of a potential 
terrorist threat draw a clear line between right and left wing parties included in our 
reference group. When we compare the PP supporters in the different treatment 
groups, the PP voters exposed to a Muslim congregation scored around 10% points 
higher than the PP voters in the control group. Thus, the PP supporters appeared to 
be more likely to support the wiretapping of Muslims than that of any other group 
in society. Even if the effect is substantial, it is not significant (SE = 7.39% points, 
p = 0.178). Hence, we can reject our third hypothesis, which posits that PP support-
ers are particularly prone to support wiretapping if the group targeted was a Muslim 
congregation. However, future studies are needed to follow up on the impact of ide-
ology. By comparing the PP supporters in the control group with the PP supporters 
Table 2  Wiretapping: test of 
interaction-effects (ANOVA 






Group-categorization × Progress Party 2.68**
 Political Behavior
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in the treatment groups, only the average level of support among the PP voters to 
wiretap their own party significantly differed. The PP supporters exposed to the PP 
treatment scored 21.9% points lower than the PP supporters in the control group 
(SE = 7.51% points, p < 0.01). The PP supporters are, however, more willing to sup-
port the wiretapping of their own party than non-PP voters, which highlights the 
high level of support for wiretapping among the party’s supporters in general.
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to examine how citizens respond to counterterrorist 
measures confronted with a realistic terrorist threat. We investigated whether atti-
tudes towards wiretapping are conditional depending on the target of the wiretap-
ping. After the attacks in the US in September 2001, citizens’ desires to live in safe 
societies have led to wider acceptance of limiting privacy and, therefore, personal 
freedom. There is an ongoing debate regarding how far democracies can go in fight-
ing terrorism before democracy itself is undermined. Our analysis contributes to this 
discussion by addressing the following two questions: (1) Do people’s perceptions 
of wiretapping depend on the target of these measures? (2) Do attitudes towards 
wiretapping certain groups interact with party preferences? To determine the effect 
of group cues, we conducted a survey experiment.
The empirical analysis resulted in four conclusions. First, citizens appear to have 
a high degree of trust in the police’s risk assessments. Notably, our experiment 
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Other
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Fig. 2  Wiretapping: Group-categorization interacted with Progress Party support. (Averages with 95% 
CI’s—N = 1399, scale 0 (strongly disagree) to 100 (strongly agree))
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plot. Therefore, the results cannot be interpreted as a carte blanche for surveillance 
under any circumstances. Moreover, among those exposed to the Progress Party as 
the target group, we observe a lower willingness to accept wiretapping. This finding 
may indicate that the population is concerned with the monitoring of political par-
ties in general. Another interpretation is that the support of monitoring decreases 
as the target group of the wiretapping is more concrete, but this is uncertain. For 
example, there is no reason to assume that support for wiretapping fundamentalist 
groups would be reduced if we had identified such specific groups in the experi-
ment. Advance knowledge may also play a role in attitudes towards wiretapping. For 
example, a reference to a concrete group (such as the PP) allows the respondents to 
critically assess the need for monitoring.
Second, exposing citizens to different social groups is highly important for deter-
mining how people form opinions regarding counterterrorist measures. Therefore, 
this study provides strong evidence against the hypothesis that the rights of individ-
uals are considered absolute. The attitudes strongly depended on the intended target 
group of the potential wiretap. The population was most prepared to permit the PST 
to investigate the two groups that the PST identified as the greatest potential security 
risks, i.e., radical Muslim and extreme right groups. Both groups are classic out-
groups that have previously demonstrated that they are willing to cross the borders 
of what is acceptable in a democracy.
Third, the respondents appear to clearly differentiate between radical Muslims 
and Muslims in general. Norwegians are not more inclined to support the wiretap-
ping of a Muslim congregation than the wiretapping of any other group in society. 
Thus, the fear of terrorism is not associated with a backlash against Muslims in gen-
eral. After the terrorist attacks in Norway in 2011, Norwegian politicians reacted 
by encouraging the population to display solidarity and fellowship. The words and 
actions of politicians (and the media) in response to terrorist incidents may affect 
citizens’ attitudes (Sniderman et al. 2019). However, we conducted our study before 
many of the major and deadly terrorist attacks in Europe. Many of the terrorist 
attacks in Western Europe in the past few years have had certain links to extreme 
Islamists and, therefore, might have had an impact on the attitudes towards the use 
of covert police methods.
Fourth, respondents react differently to the different treatments because of dif-
ferent political predispositions. Respondents supporting the Progress Party (PP) are 
more inclined to support wiretapping regardless of the targeted group compared to 
the respondents supporting other parties. PP supporters are even more willing to 
support the wiretapping of their own party compared to non-PP voters. PP support-
ers are also more inclined to support the wiretapping of Muslims, but even if the 
effect is substantial, it is indistinguishable from zero compared to PP voters in the 
control condition.
The results of our study should inspire future survey experiments to follow the 
same respondents over time to reveal how stable or context dependent these attitudes 
are. Future group-categorization experiments may also add to the literature by stud-
ying attitudes both across countries and across different counterterrorist measures 




Overall, do the results of this study indicate that people do not perceive privacy 
as an absolute right? In general, the respondents significantly supported permitting 
counterterrorist police authorities to use hidden surveillance methods if there is a 
terrorist threat. Norwegians’ high level of trust in police authorities may also turn 
out to be a double-edged sword, which may in turn make it easier to convince citi-
zens to accept extreme measures. Furthermore, this approval is conditional upon the 
group the surveillance is supposed to target. Hence, the results could be understood 
in light of the theory of so-called “out-groups”. However, only one version of the 
“out-group” theories is supported in our study. The respondents in this survey are 
most open to wiretapping if the target groups demonstrably have posed a terrorist 
threat. In essence, the population supports the threat assessments of the counterter-
rorist police. Muslims in general are not perceived as a terrorist threat.
Policy makers in Norway and elsewhere have met the terrorist threats by granting 
the counterterrorist authorities increased opportunities to use secret police methods 
(e.g. wiretapping and data-sampling) in the fight against terror. Our survey helps 
shed light on the public support for strict counterterrorist measures. This study 
reveals that the subjects of such methods directly affect the citizens’ attitudes. The 
citizens’ support of restrictive counterterrorist measures likely depends on how the 
balance between privacy and the rule of law and safety is interpreted. Before the 
attack in the US in 2001, the discussion revolved around how citizens could be pro-
tected from the state; however, the current debate is focused on how citizens and 
the state need to protect themselves against a common enemy (terrorists). Therefore, 
support among citizens towards the use of hidden police methods highly depends on 
how the fight against terrorism is framed. Further work is needed in the European 
arena to see how such frames impact citizens’ group specific attitudes.
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Table 3  Comparison of control and treatment groups: multi-nominal logistic regression with a social 
group (control group) as base outcome (log odds with standard errors in parenthesis, N = 1399)
Reference categories: Male for female, 18–25 years of age for the seven age groups, lower education for 
the university degree dummy, and other party voters and non-voters for the Progress Party voter dummy
*Significant at the 10% level
Variables Radical Muslims Muslim congregation Right-wing extremist Progress Party
Constant .264 (.335) .456 (.324) − .039 (.344) − .079 (.355)
Female − .122 (.173) − .165 (.175) .309 (.175)* − .013 (.173)
University − .125 (.180) − .053 (.184) − .311 (.181)* .119 (.182)
Age 26–35 − .223 (.400) − .597 (.398) − .153 (.412) − .528 (.434)
Age 36–45 − .217 (.399) − .151 (.383) − .097 (.408) .227 (.407)
Age 46–55 − .117 (.373) − .442 (.367) − .019 (.380) .072 (.390)
Age 56–65 − .001 (.370) − .298 (.363) .289 (.375) .163 (.388)
Age 66–75 .044 (.396) − .351 (.394) .293 (.402) .349 (.410)
75 + .466 (.596) .211 (.597) .499 (.614) .711 (.607)
Progress Party .344 (.290) .167 (.303) .169 (.304) .067 (.308)
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